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In The Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
ST. GEORGE CITY, a municipal corporation, 
vs. Plaintiff, 
MILL CREEK WATER CO'MP ANY, a 
corporntion, ISRAEL NIELSON, STEVE 
KURTLAND, MARION JOLLY, MELVIN 
ADAMS, JOHN AVE1RITT, and JOSEPH 
BARLOW, Defendants, 
WASHINGTON CITY, a municipal corpora-
tion, ROAD RUNNER INN, a corporation, 
and DARRE·LL G. HAFEN, 
Intervening Defendants, 
MILL CREEK WATER COMPANY, 
vs. Plaintiff, 
ISRAEL NIELSON and CADDIE NIELSON, 
GLEN TOBLER and BEATRICE TOBLER, 
THE CITY OF WASHINGTON, a muni-
cipal co1•poration, and NORMA WALKER, 
Defendants, 
ROAD RUNNER INN, a corporation, and 
DARRELL G. HAFEN, 
Intervening Defendants, 
MELVIN ADAMS, MARION JOLLEY, 
STEVEN E. KIRKLAND and 
WASHINGTON CITY ·CORPORATION, 
vs. Plaintiffs, 
MILL CREEK WATER COMPANY, a 
co1·poration, ST. GEORGE CITY, and the 
STATE ENGINEER OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
WASHINGTON CITY CORPORATION, 
vs. Plaintiff, 
MILL CREEK WATER COMPANY, a 
corporation, MELVIN ADAMS, ST. 
GEORGE CITY, STEVEN E. KIRKLAND, 
MARION JOLLEY and the STATE 
ENGINEER OF UTAH 
Defendants, 
MARION JOLLEY, ME'LVIN ADAMS, 
STEVEN E. KIRKLAND, 
vs. Plaintiffs, 
WASHINGTON CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant, 
JtOAD RUNNER INN, a corporation, and 
DARRELL G. HAFEN, 
Intervening Defendants, 
Case No. 2508 
Case No. 2940 
Case No. 3036 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This appeal involves three separate civil actions 
1 
filed in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for 
Washington County, which cases were consolidated 
for trial, for the reason that all three cases deal 
directly with the rights to the waters of the Mill 
or Sand Hollow Creek in Washington County, Utah, 
some of which were originally owned by the Mill 
Creek Water Company under the 1'926 "Virgin River 
Decree". 
Civil No. 2508 is a condemnation action brought 
by St. George City to condemn for domestic use the 
waters of Mill Creek. The Mill Creek Water Com-
pany, the original holder of some of the water 
rights in said stream, and the other named defend-
ants, all of whom were shareholders in the Mill 
Creek Water Company, were joined as defendants. 
Civil'No. 2940 is an action brought by the City 
of St. George in the name of the 'QMill Creek Water 
Company" to acquire easements and rights of way 
for the purpose of constructing an irrigation ditch 
to convey the waters of the plaintiff company to a 
reservoir under construction by St. George City at 
the time said action was commenced. 
Civil No. 3036 is a petition brought by the ap-
pellants herein a:sking a court review of a series of 
decisions of the Utah State Engineer bearing direct-
ly on the rights of petitioners (appellants herein) 
in the waters of the Mill or Sand Hollow Creek and 
the Green Ditch in Washington County, State of 
Utah. 
2 
The appellants herein, Steven E. Kirkland, Mel-
vin Adams, and Marion Jolley, were shareholders 
in the old Mill Creek Water Company and also had 
filed application with the State Engineer to appro-
pri'ate waters of the Mill Creek or Sand Hollow, 
these appropriations having been applied for in their 
individual capacities and not as shareholders in 
the old company, and the waters sought to be appro-
priated were waters claimed by appellants to have 
been abandoned 'by the Mill Creek Water Company. 
Appellant Washington City, a municipal corpora-
tion, 'by the terms of the Virgin River Decree is the 
owner of .38 c.f.s. of the waters of Mill Creek and 
has also filed application before the State Engineer 
to appropriate a portion of the waters also claimed 
by it to have been abandoned by the old Mill Creek 
Water Company. It should be remembered that the 
references to the "Mill Creek Water Company" here-
inabove made are to the old company of that name, 
the charter of which expired by its terms on Feb-
ruary 20, 19'53. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A summary judgment was entered by the trial 
court on motion of St. George City and the new Mill 
Creek Water Company. This judgment declared that 
the new Mill Creek Water Company was legally in-
corporated under the laws of the State of Utah and 
was the successor to all of the rights in the waters 
of Mill Creek or Sand Hollow which had been owned 
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by the old Mill Creek Water Company, the charter 
of which had expired. The court ruled in making its 
summary judgment that there had been no termin-
ation of ownership or use of the waters of Sand 
Hollow or Mill Creek between the date on which the 
corporate charter of the old company expired, Feb-
ruary 20, 1953, and the date on which the new com-
pany was incorporated, February 8, 1957. The court 
in its judgment stated that "the new company mere-
ly provided another vehicle for such ownership and 
use of such waters." Based on this premise, the 
court adjudged the new company to have succeeded 
to all of the ownership rights, interests and powers 
of the old Mill Creek Water Company. Then by its 
own fiat in having so decided, the court concluded 
as a part of the judgment that the new company 
was the proper party before the court to give juris-
diction for the effective adjudication of the rights 
in the water of Mill Creek or Sand Hollow. The 
court, further based on its own conclusion that the 
new company was a successor to the rights of the 
old company, ruled that the new company had the 
status to apply to the State Engineer for a change 
in point of diversion, under the water rights owned 
by the old company, and decreed that the State En-
gineer had rightfully entertained and approved the 
application of the said new company. It is with this 
summary judgment of the court that these appel-
lants take issue. 
4 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants ask that this court reverse the de-
cision and summary judgment of the lower court 
entered in favor of the respondent and against the 
appellants. The appellants further ask that this 
Court make its ruling that as a matter of law: 
(a) 'The corporation known and referred to as 
the old Mill Creek Water Company ceased to exist 
as a legal entity when its charter expired February 
20, 1953, and its assets including the water rights 
then owned by it reverted to the stockholders of 
record on that date. 
(b) The new Mill Creek Water Company in-
corporated in Utah February 8, 1957, did not suc-
ceed to the rights and property owned by the old 
corpora ti on. 
(c) The action of the lower court granting an 
order of occupancy depriving appellants of their 
water rights based on the premise that the new com-
pany succeeded to the rights of the old is in error, 
and results in depriving appellants of their property 
without due process of law. 
The case should be remanded to the District 
Court for trial under the law of the case as estab-
lished by the rulings of this Court on the foregoing 
matters. The district court should then be required 
to determine what water rights exist in the Mill 
C1·et:k or Sand Hollow, who the owners are, the use 
5 
that has been made thereof, and the status, as ap-
propriators before the State Engineer, of the parties 
to these actions. All rulings of the State Engineer 
relative to the water rights involved in this litiga-
tion should be suspended pending the outcome of 
this lawsuit. The trial court should further be in-
structed to ascertain what damages, if any, have 
been suffered by the appellants as a result of having 
been deprived of the use of waters of Mill Creek or 
Sand Hollow, to which appellants are determined to 
have been properly entitled, by St. George City 
under the order of occupancy erroneously granted 
by the lower court on the 20th day of May, 1957. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Mill Creek Water Company was organ-
ized and incorporated as a mutual water company 
in the State of Utah on February 20, 1903, by the 
then land owners and appropriators of the waters 
of Mill Creek and Green Spring in Washington 
County, State of Utah, for the purpose of control-
ling, regulating and distributing the said waters. 
The articles of said corporation limited its exist-
ence to a period of fifty ( 50) years and provided 
for a capitalization of 21171/2 shares of stock. All 
assets of the company were owned and controlled 
by the stockholders. ( R. 92) 
2. No certificates of stock were actually issued 
by the Mill Creek Water Company until March 8, 
6 
1923 when certificates totaling 196 shares were is-
sued to the following parties: ( R. 9'2) 
Cert. No. Name No. Shares 
1 Samuel L. Gould 4 
2 Morgan W. Adams 35 
3 M. E. Averett lTY2 
4 Robert L. Covington 5 
5 Sherman Cooper lll-h 
6 E. M. Iverson 6 
7 W. L. Jolley 7V2 
8 A.H. Larson V2 
9 Willard Larson 14 
10 Israel Neilson, Sr. 25 
11 Israel Neilson, Jr. 221h 
12 Edward F. Nisson 4 
13 Washington Mill Co. 24V2 
14 David Turner Est. 2 
15 Claude Adams 8 
16 Peter Neilson, Sr. 5 
17 Joseph Judd 4 
3. On December 12, 1925, by decree entered 
in the District Court of Washington County, State 
of Utah, commonly known as the "Virgin River De-
cree," 2.57 c.f.s. of water from Sand Hollow Creek 
was awarded to the Mill Creek Water Company for 
use on 141.5 acres located as follows: 20. 7 acres 
in Section 22, and 77.1 acres in Section 2'3, both 
dlverted from Sand Hollow Creek in West Ditch 
and 43. 7 acres in Section 23 diverted from Sand 
7 
Hollow Creek in East Ditch. Under awards No. 176 
and 176A of the Virgin River Decree, Washington 
City diverts 0.68 c.f.s. of water from Mill Creek 
into Tanner Ditch for domestic use. (R. 92; Ex. 1) 
4. Thereafter. the Mill Creek Water Company 
continued to deal with and distribute the 2.57 c.f.s. 
of the waters of Sand Hollow or Mill Creek, and 
over the years there was some trading, selling or 
otherwise disposing of their water rights by the 
company's stockholders. (R. 9'3) 
5. On February 20, 1953, the said company 
concluded fifty ( 50) years of corporate existence. 
No action was taken to extend the life of the corpor-
ation prior to that date. ( R. 93) 
6. On February 20, 1953 the officers of the 
company included among others the following: (R. 
93) 
Edward F. Nisson-President 
Marion Jolley - Director 
Melvin Adams - Director 
Israel Neilson - Secretary-Treasurer 
7. The records of the said company showed 
the following as stockholders of the company on 
February 20, 1953 at the expir:ation of the com-
pany's charter: ( R. 93) 
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Name Certificate No. Shares 
Claude Adams 51 8 
Melvin Adams 50 24 
Melvin Adams 31 5 
M. E. Averett 3 171/2 
Joel C. Barlow 47 1 
Sherman Cooper 5 1 
William Gould 30 4 
Marion Jolley 33 31h 
W. L. Jolley 7 71h 
W. L. Jolley 26 l/2 
Frank Larsen 34 9 
Israel Nielsen, Jr., Vernal 
M. Nielsen and 
Anton Nielson 35 25 
Israel Nielsen, Jr. 11 212112 
Clark Nisson 43 8 
Edward F. Nisson 21 3 
Wayne Sandberg 4'2 301h 
Wayne Sandberg 49 13 
Wayne Sanberg 45 5 
Ivan Wittwer 46 8 
8. Without taking any evidence or receiving 
any affidavits on which to base the same the trial 
court found ( R. 93), that the stockholders continued 
to use all of the waters of Sand Hollow or Mill Creek 
as they had done previously, and that there was no 
indication whatever that anyone paid any attention 
9 
to the fact that the fifty year period had expired. 
('R. 93) 
9. On February 8, 1957, Articles of Incorpor-
ation of a company called the "Mill Creek Water 
Company" were filed with the Secretary of the State 
of lJtah, (Ex. 9) naming the following as officers 
and directors: ( R. 93-94) 
Edward F. Nisson, President-Director 
Marion Jolley, Vice President-Director 
Melvin Adams, Director 
John W. Averett, Director 
Israel Nielson, Director, Secretary.:Treasurer 
The articles filed provided for the stock of the 
corporation to be divided into 195 shares of the par 
value of $100.00 each, and recited that the stock was 
fully subscribed. The amount of capital stock in the 
new company purportedly issued to the incorporators 
at the time of incorporation was as follows: 
Name No. Shares 
Edward F. Nissan 11 
Marion J alley 111/2 
Melvin Adams 29 
John W. Averett 171/2 
Israel Nielson 221/2 
10. The trial court found that after its in-
corporation the new Mill Creek Water Company 
dealt with the waters of Sand Hollow or Mill Creek 
and the 2.57 c.f.s. of water decreed to the old Mill 
Creek Water Company under the Virgin River De-
10 
cree, and made a change application to the State 
Engineer and otherwise acted as a mutual irrigation 
company essentially as the old Mill Creek Water 
Company had done during the fifty years of its cor-
porate life. ( R. 94) 
11. Without taking testimony and with no evi-
dence save a copy of the articles of the new com-
pany the trial court found there was some indica-
tion of changes in the ownership of the stock of the 
old company and the new company between Feb-
ruary 1953 and February 1957, and stated that this 
was attributable to the normal sale or trade of stock 
by the holders thereof. The trial court also found 
that the stock in the new company appeared to have 
been issued in proportion to the stock held in the old 
company and that St. George City had purchased 
106 shares of stock in the new company. (R. 94) 
12. On April 16, 1957, the City of St. George 
filed Civil Action No. '2508, whereby it sought to 
condemn the 2.57 c.f.s. of the waters of Sand Hol-
low belonging to the "Mill Creek ·water Company." 
Joined in the action as defendants were the follow-
ing individuals to whom the City of St. George con-
ceded the amount of stock in the "Mill Creek Water 
Company" listed opposite their names: 
11 
Name No. Shares 
Joseph Barlow (Subject to an agree-
ment to sell the same to 
Steven Kirkland) 9 
Israel Nielson 121/2 
Marion Jolley 111/2 
Melvin Adams 29 
John Averett 171/2 
Said action did not seek to condemn any of the 
waters of Green Spring, but only Sand Hollow water. 
At the time said action was filed by St. George City, 
it had no rapplication before the State Engineer of 
the State of Utah to either appropriate the waters 
or to change the point of diversion of the waters of 
the Mill Creek stream. (R. 94, R. 1-9) 
13. On April 29, 1957, the City of St. George 
filed an application with the Utah State Engineer's 
office, Application No. 29081, to appropriate 3.00 
c.f.s. of the waters of Mill Creek. ( R. 95; Ex. 8) 
14. On May 20, 1957, the trial court granted 
St. George City an order allowing temporary pos-
session of 2.57 c.f.s. of the waters of the springs 
known as Sand Hollow Springs, and to permit col-
lection and use of the same, ordered installation of 
measuring devices and authorized the doing of such 
other things as were necessary to collect, develop, 
measure and use the said water during the pendency 
of its action. St. George City took possession of the 
waters of Sand Hollow under said order and has 
at all times and still continues in possession of all 
12 
of said waters to the exclusion of appellants. (R. 95) 
15. Pursuant to said order, St. George City 
collected and continues to collect water within the 
springs area upstream from all present diversions 
and is conveying the water from the springs area 
consisting of 42 springs, by pipe line to a pumping 
plant from which waters are conveyed to and used 
by St. George City. (R. 95) 
16. On Janitary 28, 1958, the City of Wash-
ington filed Application No. 29676 in the State En-
gineer's office to appropriate 3.00 c.f.s. from Sand 
Hollow Creek for domestic use in said city. (R. 95; 
Ex. 2) 
17. On January 14, 1959, Application No. 
29081 originally filed by St. George to appropriate 
3.00 c.f .s. of 'Sand Hollow water was rejected by 
the State Engineer, on the grounds that any addi-
tional water taken from the source or sources of 
Mill Creek would interfere with the decreed and cer-
tified rights of lower users who maintained dry 
dams below the point of diversion. The State En-
gineer further held there was no unappropriated 
water in the Mill Creek. No appeal from such rejec-
tion was ever filed by the City of St. George. (R. 
95; Ex. 8) 
18. On April 17, 1959, the City of St. George 
filed application No. 59-5 with the Utah State En-
gineer, seeking a temporary change of point of di-
13 
version of 2.57 c.f.s. of water from Sand Hollow 
Creek. ( R. 95-96; Ex. 3) 
19. On April 24, 1.959, Application No. 59-5 
filed by the City of St. George was approved by the 
State Engineer. ( R. 96; Ex. 3) 
20. On July 21, 1959, Washington City filed 
Application No. a-3592 with the Utah State Engin-
eer for a permanent change of point of diversion of 
.35 c.f.s. of water from Sand Hollow. (R. 96; Ex. 4) 
21. On July 22, 1959, Washington City filed 
Application No. a-3593 with the Utah State Engin-
eer for a permanent change of point of diversion of 
0.03 c.f.s. of water from Sand Hollow. (R. 96; Ex. 
5) 
22. On May 5, 1960, the City of St. George 
filed Application No. 3741 with the Utah State En-
gineer to implement the court's order in awarding 
temporary possession of the Mill Creek waters. The 
State Engineer thereafter ruled that this applica-
tion was not a proper foundation for action by the 
State Engineer and requested that a new change 
application be filed in the name of the holder of the 
water right. ( R. 96) 
23. On July 7, 1961, the new Mill Creek Water 
Company filed application for permanent change of 
point of diversion of 2.57 c.f.s. of water from Sand 
Hollow, Application No. a-3970. This application 
of Mill Creek Water Company to change the point 
of diversion of the Sand Hollow waters described 
but two points of diversion. It does not set forth 
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the extent of each area, or the points of development 
work therein or the points of comingling waters 
within such area. (R. 96 ; Ex. 6) 
24. On August 7, 1961, the City of St. George 
filed in the name of the new Mill Creek Water Com-
pany, in the District Court in and for Washington 
County, State of Utah, Civil Action No. 2940, nam-
ing Israel Neilsen, et al. as defendants, whereby 
said company sought an order permitting it to enter 
upon the lands of the defendants for the purpose of 
collecting water and for the construction of reser-
voirs and ditches for the conveying of the subject 
waters "for the benefit of its stockholders." ( R. 96; 
R. 1-5) 
25. On September 20, 1961, in civil action No. 
2940, an order was entered by said court, granting 
the possession of easements and rights of way to 
construct a ditch across lands of the defendants 
named in said action. ( R. 96; R. II 6-8) 
26. On October 2, 1961, Melvin Adams, Steven 
Kirkland and Marion Jolley filed Application No. 
a-4017 with the State Engineer, seeking a perman-
ent change of point of diversion of 2.57 c.f.s. of 
water from Sand Hollow. (R. 96-97; Ex. 7) 
27. On April 6, 1962, the State Engineer re-
jected Applications numbered 29676 and a-4017, 
filed by Washington City and by Melvin Adams, 
Steven Kirkland and Marion Jolley respectively, on 
the grounds that there was no unappropriated 
water in the stream and for the further reason that 
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none of the individual parties were proper ap-
plicants, since they did not hold water rights pri-
vately, they being minority stockholders in the 
new Mill Creek Water Company. (R. 97; Exs. 2, 7) 
28. Also on April 6, 1.962, the State Engineer 
approved Applications numbered a-3592 and a-3593, 
filed by Washington City and a-3970 filed by St. 
George City in the name of the Mill Creek Water 
Company to permanently change the points of diver-
sion of the waters of the Mill Creek. However, from 
1957 to date, Washington City has been deprived 
by 'St. George City of the .38 c.f.s. of water to which 
Washington City is entitled under the Virgin River 
Decree, and has been prevented from changing the 
point of diversion, which it is entitled to change un-
der Applications numbered a-3592 and a-3593 as 
approved by the Utah State Engineer. (R. 97; Exs. 
4, 5) 
29. On June 5, 1962, Washington City, Mel-
vin Adams, Marion Jolley and Steven Kirkland filed 
Civil Action No. 3036 in the District Court in and 
for Washington County, Utah, which action was for 
review of the State Engineer's action in the Matters 
of Change Applications numbered a-3970, a-3592, 
a-3593, a-4017 and 29676. (R. 97; R.III 1-3) 
30. On November 28, 1.962, Cases numbered 
2508, 2940 and 3036 were consolidated for trial. 
(R. 97; R. 30) 
31. On the 21st day of January, 1963, motions 
for summary judgment came on regularly for hear-
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ing before the Fifth Judicial District Court in and 
for Washington County, the Honorable C. Nelson 
Day presiding (Tr. 1-61). Following arguments of 
counsel for all parties and the submission of briefs, 
the motions were taken under advisement by the 
court. 
32. On the 4th day of August, 1964, the court 
entered its memorandum decision on the motions for 
summary judgment (R. 86-89) 
33. On the 20th day of May, 1965, in support 
of the said memorandum decision Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and a Summary Judgment were 
entered by the court (R. 90-103). 
34. The trial court concluded: 
(a) That the failure of the officers and 
directors of the old Mill Creek Water Company to 
amend its Articles for the purpose of continuing its 
term of corporate existence was an inadvertance, 
and oversight, and that such failure was not an in-
tentional act or ommission for the purpose of in 
fact terminating the corporate existence of the Mill 
Creek Water Company; 
(b) That when it was determined by these 
Washington County farmers and water-users that 
the time set forth in the original Articles had in fact 
expired, they then acted to continue their ownership 
and use of the same water by forming a new corpor-
ate entity with the same officers, directors and 
stockholders except that there have been some 
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change in ownership by sale or trade of stock in-
terests during the intervening period; 
( c) That St. George City has acquired by 
purchase 106 shares of the stock of the new Mill 
Creek Water Company and by virtue of such pur-
chase, St. George City has been entitled to 106/195 
of the waters of Sand Hollow Creek since said shares 
were purchased; 
( d) That there was no termination of 
ownership in or the use of the waters of Sand Hol-
low between February 1953 and February 1957, 
and that the new company merely provided another 
vehicle for such ownership and use of the subject 
water; 
( e) That insofar as is material and per-
tinent to each of the above entitled causes, the ne1c 
Mill Creek Water Company succeeded to and has 
all of the ownership, rights, interests and powers of 
the old Mill Creek Water Company in and to the 
waters of Sand Hollow or Mill Creek and in and to 
the 2.57 c.f.s. of water decreed under and in the 
Virgin River Decree; 
(f) That since the new Mill Creek Water 
Company succeeded to all the ownership, rights, and 
interest 1and powers of the old Mill Creek Water 
Company, the trial court acquired jurisdiction of the 
proper parties in the proceedings under which St. 
George was granted a temporary order of possession 
of the waters awarded to the old Mill Creek Water 
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Compalty under the Virgin River Decree, and said 
new Mill Creek Water Company had the right to 
sue and it could be sued; 
(g) That the new Mill Creek Water Com-
pany had a right to apply for the change of point 
of diversion of the waters applied for in Applica-
tion No. a-3970, and that said new company did 
comply with the laws pertaining to such applica-
tions and the State Engineer properly granted said 
application and that the same should not be rejected; 
and 
(h) That St. George City in its application 
for temporary change of point of diversion did not 
conform to the provisions of Section 73-3-3 Utah 
Code Annotated (1953). (R. 97, 98) 
35. The reservoirs and ditches, for which the 
easements and rights of way were sought in Civil 
No. 2940, have in fact been constructed, all in the 
absence of any application to the State Engineer 
as required by Section 73-3-20 Utah Code Anno-
tated ( 1953) as amended. 
36. Since the "temporary" order of occup-
ancy was entered by the trial court on the 20th day 
of May, 1957, St. George City has continued during 
the critical summer months in each of the interim 
years to deprive the appellants of the water to which 
they are legally entitled, resulting in a total loss 
of their agricultural crops during the growing seas-
on from 1957 to and including the summer of 1965. 
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37. St. George City has paid nothing to the 
appellants for the water so taken or for the result-
ant damages. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
AFTER THE PERIOD OF EXISTENCE OF A 
CORPORATION HAS EXPIRED BY FORCE OF EX-
PRESS PROVISION IN ITS CHARTER, AND IN THE 
ABSENCE OF ANY STATUTORY PROVISION AUTH-
ORIZING ITS EXTENSION OR CONTINUANCE, IT BE-
COMES IPSO FACTO DISSOLVED AND NO LONGER 
HAS ANY LEGAL EXISTENCE EITHER DE JURE 
OR DE FACTO FOR THERE IS NO LAW UNDER 
WHICH IT CAN EXIST. 
The doctrine of the common law concerning 
lapsation of corporate charters was that upon ex-
piration o'f its charter a corporation at once lost its 
identity and its powers; and it life was instantly 
terminated. See discussion in In re Booth's Drug 
Store Inc. 19 F. Supp. 95, at 96 (D.C. W. Va. 1937) 
citing TAYLOR ON CORPORATIONS Sec. 21 (5th 
Ed.); 1 Blackstone's Commentaries; ANG. And 
AMES ON CORPORATIONS Sec. 770. 
In the course of time, however, all of the states 
have enacted statutes relating to the duties, powers, 
responsibilities and liabilities of corporations as af-
fected by their dissolution or the forfeiture of their 
corporate existence. (See authorities cited under 
Point 2 infra). 
The modern general rule is that the expiration 
of a corporate charter results in the instant legal 
20 
death of a corporation. In 47 A.L.R. 1282, at 1297-
12.98 the rule is stated as follows: 
" ... apart from the operation of a modi-
fying statute, a corporation becomes absolu-
tely dissolved and defunct, without any judi-
cial pronouncement to that effect, when the 
period of its existence as defined by the sta-
tute under which it was organized, or by its 
charter or articles of association, has expired. 
"If the charter be not extended, the very 
moment that period arrives, the corporation 
stands, not dormant, disabled, or incapable of 
action merely, but absolutley dissolved, civilly 
dead, without life or being, and altogether at 
an end. 
''If the law under which a corporation is 
organized, or the special act creating the corp-
oration, fixes a definite time when its corp-
orate Hfe must end, it is evident that when 
that date is reached said corporation is ipso 
facto dissolved, without any direct action on 
the part of the state or its members." 
See also discussions in 97 A.L.R. 477, at 495 et seq; 
8 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, 'Sec. 4096; 16A 
Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Sec. 7981; 19 Am. 
Jur. 2d Corporations, Secs. 1586, 1590, and 1648; 
19 C.J.S. Corporations, Sec. 1653; and LATTIN ON 
CORPORATIONS Page 555. See also M. H. Mc-
Carthy Co. v. Dubuque, Dist. Ct. 208 N.W. 505 
(Iowa 1926); In re Koretke Brass and Mfg. Co. 
Ltd., 196 So. 917 (La. 1940) ; Lake Superior Piling 
Co. v. Stevens, 60 So.'2d 22'1 (La. 1'95'2); and Glenn 
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v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 127 F.2d 820 
(C.A. 6th 1942) . 
Apparently this general problem has been be-
fore this Court on only one earlier occasion. in the 
case of Houston v. Utah Lake, Land, Water and 
Power Co., 55 Utah 393, 187 Pac. 174 (1919) this 
Court, speaking through Justice Weber at 176, 
stated: 
"Numerous errors based upon exclusion 
of testimony are assigned, but the only ques-
tion that need be considered, and which is de-
cisive, is whether a corporation whose charter 
has been forfeited for the nonpayment of the 
state corporation license tax in this state may 
thereafter engage in new business and em-
bark upon new enterprises," 
(Then follows the citation of Laws of 1917 
which are similar to our present laws permit-
ting its continued existence to wind up its 
affairs). 
"It is argued by counsel for appellants 
that Section 870 not only 'extends the life of 
the corporation for the purpose of winding up 
its affairs,' but that it is 'a modification of or 
the creation of a new purpose clause,' and that 
therefore 'the question whether the transac-
tions in question are beyond the powers of the 
corporation must be determined with refer-
ence to whether they occurred for the purpose 
of winding up the company.' Mr. Whitney, the 
president of the Utah company, repeatedly 
made the statement in his deposition that 'the 
purchase of the stock of the Los Angeles Mort-
gage Company was done for the purpose of 
winding up the affairs of the defendant corp-
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oration.' Mr. Whitney's statement as to the 
purpose of the various transactions to which 
he testified is a bare conclusion. The undis-
puted facts are that a corporation that was 
dead for all purposes except for winding up 
its affairs purchased stock in a California 
corporation, took charge of that corporation, 
and engaged in a business that was beyond 
the scope of its powers even before its civil 
death. Instead of winding up the affairs of 
the com'[Xlny, the testimony of Mr. Whitney 
indicated an attempt to resuscitate it." (em-
phasis added) 
"Whatever may have been Mr. Whitney's 
purpose, his acts were designed and calcul-
ated not to wind up the affairs of the com-
pany, but to enlarge and extend its field of 
operation. To contend that these transactions 
had any tendency to close or wind up the busi-
ness affairs of the Utah corporation is a mere 
juggle with words. It is utterly fallacious to 
say that a corporation by its corporate death 
is given everlasting corporate Zif e ... " (em-
phasis added) . . . 
It is, therefore, obvious that whether a corpor-
ate charter is lost through forfeiture for noncom-
pliance with state law or through lapsation, the 
period of its legal existence has terminated; and 
the only course of action open to the corporation 
through its board of directors is to wind up its af-
fairs. 
Moreover, where a corporation continues to ex-
ercise, without authority, its corporate powers after 
the expiration of its charter by lapse of time, it does 
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not become even a de facto corporation insofar as 
it may assert rights and powers as a corporation. 
See Screwmen's Benevolent Ass'rz. v. Monteleone, 
123 So. 117 at 119 (La. 1929) ; and 8 Fletcher Cy-
clopedia Corporations, Sec. 3842. 
POINT 2 
THE ONLY LEGAL COURSE OF ACTION OPEN 
TO THE OLD MILL CREEK WATER COMP ANY 
AFTER THE LAPSATION OF ITS CORPORATE CHAR-
TER IN 1953 WAS TO PROCEED TO WIND UP ITS 
AFFAIRS AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 16-1-2 UT AH 
CODE ANNOTATED (1953). 
The statute which was controlling at the time 
the charter of the old Mill Creek Water Company 
lapsed on February 20, 1953, was Section 16-1-2 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) which read as follows: 
"Any corporation organized under the 
laws of the territory or state of Utah whose 
franchise has heretofore expired or may here-
after expire by limitation or by forfeiture, or 
by dissolution by decree of court may never-
theless continue for the purpose of winding 
up its affairs; and to effect this purpose may 
sell or otherwise dispose of real and personal 
property, sue and be sued, contract, and exer-
cise all other incidental and necesary powers." 
(emphasis added) 
This statutory provision was repealed by laws 
of 1961, Chapter 28, 'Section 142, but was never-
theless the controlling law throughout the period 
here in question. 
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This court in the Houston case, supra, drew 
clea1· lines on what it meant to "wind up affairs." 
The new Mill Creek vVater Company in incorporat-
ing under Utah law and seeking to appropriate to 
itself the assets of the oUl corporation of the same 
name acted neither in compliance with state statutes 
or the pronouncements of this Court. 
The authority to continue corporate existence 
for the purpose of winding up its affairs may be 
exercised by a corporation to the full extent neces-
sary. However, it cannot simply continue its regu-
lar business. See generally 19 C.J.S. Corporations, 
Sec. 17 43 (a) ( 4), Page 1509; Trower v. Stonebrak-
a-Zea Livestock Co., 17 F.Supp. 687, at 689 (D.C. 
Okla. 1937); In re International Sugar Feed Co., 
23 F.Supp. 197 (D.C. Minn. 1938); Jacques v. 
Goggin et al., 245 S.W.2d 904, at 9'10 (Mo. 1952); 
Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons, 213 S.W.2d 864, 
at 871; Southwestern Construction Co. v. Robbins, 
27 So.2d 705; and W estpark Realty Co. v. Porth, 
212 N.W. 651; and 97 A.L.R. 477, at 495. 
Even if present Utah law were applied to such 
a situation, i.e. the lapsation of a corporate charter 
due to the expiration of a term of existence provided 
under its articles of incorporation, the maximum 
pe1·iod which could be allowed to such a corporation 
to correct the situation would 'be two years as pro-
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vided by Section 16-10-100 Uwh Code Amwtated 
(1953) as amended, which reads in part as follows: 
"The dissolution of a corporation either: 
... or (3) by expiration of its period of dur-
ation, shall not take away or impair any re-
medy available to or against the corporation, 
its directors, officers, or shareholders, for any 
right or claim existing, or any liability in-
curred, prior to such dissolution if action or 
other proceeding thereon is commenced within 
two years after the date of such dissolution. 
Any such action or proceeding by or against 
the corporation may be prosecuted or defend-
ed by the corporation in its corporate name. 
The shareholders, directors and officers shall 
have power to take such corporate or other 
action as shall be appropriate to protect such 
remedy, right or claim. If such corporation 
was dissolved by the expiration of its period 
of duration, such corporation may amend its 
articles of incorporation at any time during 
such period of two years so as to extend its 
period of duration." (emphasis added) 
The provisions of Section 16-1-2, Utah Code 
Annotated {1953) still appear essentially in the 
same form in the present code in Section 16-10-101 
Utah Code Annotated {1953) as amended, which 
now reads as follows : 
"Notwithstanding the dissolution of a 
corporation either ( 1) by the issuance of a 
certificate of dissolut10n by the secretary of 
state, or ( 2) by a decree of court, or ( 3) by 
expiration of its period of duration, the corp-
orate existence of such corporation shall nev-
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ertheless continue for the purpose of wind-
ing up its affairs in respect to any property 
and assets which have not been distributed 
or otherwise disposed of prior to such dissolu-
tion, and to effect such purpose such corpora-
tion may sell or otherwise dispose of such pro-
perty and assets, sue and be sued, contract, 
and exercise all other incidental and neces-
sary powers." (emphasis added) 
Admittedly, under the facts of the instant cases, 
no effort was made by the old Mill Creek Water 
Company to correct the lapsation of its charter 
even if provision had existed for such action in 1953, 
and such lapsation went unnoticed until the City of 
St. George attempted to purchase the subject water 
rights, St. George then concluded that the corpora-
tion was legally dead. The attempt to place the new 
corporation on a firm legal basis as owner of the 
assets of the old corporation and then attempt to 
condemn its property must fail by reason of the 
deficiency of the procedure followed. 
It is obvious that the m o t i v e s for the 
action of the directors in this attempt, whether for 
the good faith purpose of creating a corporation 
on a sound legal basis, or merely to facilitate the 
contemplated condemnation of the subject waters 
by St. George City, are irrelevant. Upon the expira-
tion of its charter, the old Mill Creek Water died 
a legal death and the only course of action open to 
the directors was to proceed to wind up its affairs. 
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POINT 3 
UPON DISSOLUTION OF A CORPORATION, THE 
CORPORA'TE PROPERTY VESTS IN THE STOCK-
HOLDERS, SUBJECT TO THE LIABILITIES OF THE 
CORPORATION. 
After dissolution the property and the assets 
of a corporation are preserved for the benefit of 
those entitled to share in them either as creditors 
or stockholders, the property being that of the stock-
holders impressed with a trust in favor of creditors. 
See generally 19 C.J.S. Corporations, Section 1730; 
19A Am. Jur. Corporations, Sec. 1660; 16A Flet-
cher Cyclopedia of Corporations, Sections 8130, 8131 
and 8134; and 97 A.L.R. 477 at 487. See also Smith 
v. Long, 281 P.2d 483 at 486 (Idaho 1955) (citing 
extensive authorities); Mt. Carmel R. Co. v. M. A. 
Hanna Co., 89 A.2d 508 (Pa. 1952); Peora Coal Co. 
v. Ashcraft, 17 S.E.2d 444 at 447 (W. Va. 1941); 
Milgram v. Jiffy Equipment Co., '247 S.W.2d 668 
at 676 (Mo. 1952); and Schram v. Houtteman, 50 
F.Supp. 119 at 121 (D.C. Mich. 194'3). 
This same principle applies to a mutual water 
company. The general rule is stated in 3 Kinney 011 
Irrigation and Water Rights, Sec. 1481, p. 2661-62 
as follows: 
"In the formation of mutual water or 
irrigation corporations it is the usual .n:ode 
of procedure for the owners of the ongmal 
rights to deed to the corporation their water 
rights and rights in the works, and then t11 
take shares of stock for the same in the exact 
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proportion as the value of the individual 
rights granted bears to the whole value of the 
property granted by all. It therefore follows 
that, where this is done, the legal title to these 
rights is in the corporation, while the equit-
able title remains in the original owners, or 
their grantees. In other words, the company 
holds the legal title to the property in trust 
for its respective shareholders, the terms of 
the trust to be governed by the articles of in-
corporation, or by-laws of the same. 
"A mutual irrigation corporation may 
dissolve, in which case the water rights re-
vert to the shareholders in proportion to their 
holdings in the corporation ... " (emphasis 
added) 
The nature of the rights of the shareholders 
of a mutual water corn pany in Utah, were clearly 
defined by this court in the case of Genola Town 
v. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 88, 80 P.2d 930, at 936 
( 1938) as follows: 
" ... Stock in a mutual company entails 
the right to demand such stockholder's aliquot 
share of the water in proportion as his stock 
holding bears to all the stock. Water rights are 
pooled in a mutual company for convenience 
of operation and more efficient distribution, 
and perhaps for more convenient transfer. 
But the stock certificate is not like the stock 
certificate in a company operated for profit. 
It is really a certificate showing an undi-
vided part ownership in a certain water sup-
ply ... " 
This principle was recently reaffirmed by this 
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court in the case of Green Ditch Water Co. v. Salt 
Lake City, 15 U.2d 224, 390 P.2d 586 (1964). 
POINT 4 
WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT THE WATERS OF A 
MUTUAL IRRIGA:TION COMPANY CANNOT BE LOST 
AS LONG AS ANY SHAREHOLDER MAKES USE OF 
THE WATER, THIS PROTECTION CONTINUES ONLY 
SO LONG AS THE CORPORATION CONTINUES TO 
EXIST AS A LEGAL ENTITY. 
The protection given to shareholders of a mu-
tual irrigation company who are making no use of 
their water rights, by shareholders who do use the 
subject water rights, was discussed by this Court 
in the case of Smithfield West Bench Irrigation Co. 
v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 105 Utah 468, 
142 P.2d 866 at 869 (1943), where it stated through 
Mr. Justice Larson that: 
"The waters of a mutual irrigation com-
pany belong to the users, the company being 
merely a distributing and apportioning trus-
tee ... The water controlled by it may be 
used by any shareholders, subject only to the 
regulation thereof by the company for the 
benefit of the shareholders so none shall be 
deprived of his rights by the others. The com-
pany cannot sell any of the water without the 
consent of the stockholders or for nonpayment 
of dues if the articles of incorporation make 
the stock liable for such costs and expenses. 
Likewise the company cannot permit the 
water to be lost by non-use thereof as long as 
any shareholder desires to and is in a position 
to use the water. Water undistributed may be 
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used by any stockholder in a position to use 
it. The shareholders are in effect owners in 
common of the waters with certain limita-
tions as between one another governing the 
use thereof. Each may therefore use any 
water not being used by any other share-
holder, as is the case with other owners in 
common." 
While it appears from the Smithfield decision 
that the use of the company's water made by any 
stockholder of a mutual irrigation company protects 
those water rights being used, against appropria-
tion by those who are not shareholders, it must 
necessarily follow that this protection extends only 
to the waters actually being used and such protec-
tion continues only so long as the covporation con-
tinues to exist, and that upon dissolution even the 
protection provided by the corporation ends and the 
waters which were controlled and used by the corp-
oration then pass to the stockholders of record. From 
that point in time any stockholder who ceased to 
use the same, would lose his share of such water 
rights, and the waters would become open to appro-
priation by others through compliance with the ap-
plicable Utah statutes covering appropriation, as 
had the waters of the company at an earlier point 
in time since the same were not being used by share-
holders of the company. 
After dissolution as discussed in Point 1 supra, 
the remaining water rights ·of the old Mill Creek 
Water Company passed to its shareholders of record 
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as set out under No. 7 of the Statement of Facts 
supra, in proportion to their interest in the old com-
pany. From that point in time forward, it would 
appear logical that the water rights of each indivi-
dual would be a matter of personal concern; and to 
prevent the further loss of these rights through non-
use would be a matter for each individual holder of 
such rights. Under Utah law the right of the users 
of these waters would date from the priorities ac-
knowledged by the Utah courts in the Virgin River 
Decree, to-wit 1860 (Ex. 1). However, the long ex-
istent priorities would not prevent the loss of the 
rights if the waters were subsequently abandoned 
or forfeited under applicable statutes. (For this 
Court's most recent discussion of the question of 
abandonment and statutory forfeiture see In 1·e 
Drainage Area of Boar River in Rich County, 12 
U.2d 1, 361P.2d407 (1961); In re Escalante Valley 
Drainage Area, 12 U.2d 112, 363 P.2d 777 (1961). 
See also 2 Digest of Utah Water Law, pages 5 and 
6.) 
Since no evidence has been taken in the instant 
cases concerning the use of the subject waters by 
the former shareholders of the old company between 
the years 192'3 and 195'7, the cases should be re· 
mantled for a determination of these rights in terms 
of the Mill Creek Water Company which retained 
at least a part of its rights through the diligent use 
of some of its shareholders, the individuals who re· 
tained their rights through diligent use and acquir-
ed new rights through appropriation, those indi· 
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viduals who lost their rights through abandonment 
or forfeiture and a determination of the extent of 
the rights of all individuals who are determined to 
have retained valid rights in the waters of the Mill 
Creek and Green Ditch in Washington County, 
Utah. 
POINT 5 
THE NEW MILL CREEK WATER COMPANY 
DOES NOT OWN ANY RIGHTS IN THE WATERS OF 
THE SAND HOLLOW OR GREEN DITCH IN WASH-
INGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
The new Mill Creek Water Company which was 
organized on February 8, 1957 did not then own and 
does not now own rights in the waters of Sand 
Hollow or the Green Ditch since no assignments or 
other valid tr an sf er of such water rights from the 
recognized legal owners have ever been made to the 
new company. 
POINT 6 
THE NEW MILL CREEK WATER COMPANY WAS 
NOT INCORPORATED IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
STATUTES OF THE STATE OF UTAH AS THEY EX-
ISTED ON FEBRUARY 8, 1957. 
Section 16-2-5 ( 9) , Utah Code A nnovated 
(1953) required that articles of incorporation state: 
"How many of the entire board of directors 
shall be necessary to form a quorum and be 
authorized to transact the business and exer-
cise the corporate powers of the corporation; 
provided, that a quorum shall be not less than 
one-fourth of the entire number." 
Section 16-2-6, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
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requires inter alia the oath or affirmation of three 
or more incorporators that: 
" ... They have commenced, or it is bona 
fide their intention to commence and carry 
on, the business mentioned in the articles of 
incorporation, and that . . . [they] ... believe 
that each party to the articles of incorporation 
has paid, or is able to and will pay the amount 
of the capital stock subscribed for by him; and 
that at least ten percent of the capital stock 
subscribed by each stockholder and not less 
than ten percent of the capital stock of the 
corporation has been paid in ... " 
The incorporators of the new Mill Creek Water 
Company did not comply with the foregoing statu-
tory provisions (See Ex. 9) . 
The result is that the Corporation did not be-
come a corporation de jure. It had no standing at 
law and could not lawfully be the defendant, under 
such circumstances, to the eminent domain suit 
brought by the City of St. George. It possessed 
neither a qualified legal existence nor possessed any 
of the property rights involved in said action. 
POINT 7 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2508 BROUGHT BY THE CITY 
OF ST. GEORGE TO CONDEMN THE WATERS OF 
THE NEW MILL CREEK WATER COMPANY WAS AN 
INEFFECTUAL ACTION IN THAT THE NEW MILL 
CREEK WATER COMPANY HAD NO RIGHTS IN THE 
SUBJECT WATERS WHICH COULD BE CONDEMNED 
BY ST. GEORGE CI'TY, AND ALL OWNERS OF SUCH 
RIGHTS WERE NOT JOINED IN THE ACTION. 
Since on the facts of this case it appears that 
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the city of St. George was attempting to dbtain addi-
tional culinary water through condemnation of the 
Sand Hollow or Mill Creek waters in Washington 
County, it was mandatory that all individuals own-
ing such water rights be properly made parties de-
fendant to any condemnation action. The city of St. 
George, however, chose to sue the new Mill Creek 
Water Company, and merely joined thereto as par-
ties defendant the individual appellants in these 
cases. The individuals owning the full 2.57 c.f.s of 
water, including those individuals who had acquired 
portions thereof through appropriation after aban-
donment by the original owners thereof, should all 
have been before the court in said action No. 2508, 
and their absence would make an equitable final 
determination of the action impossible. Clearly the 
summary judgment entered by the court below with-
out having before it the facts upon which to deter-
mine the issues raised by appellants' contention that 
they had appropriated certain of the waters aban-
doned by the oUl, company, and holding that the 
new company was the owner of 1all of the rights of 
the old company is without any foundation and re-
sults in the appellants having been deprived of their 
property without due process of law. Appellants 
at the least were entitled to put before the court the 
facts and have their rights 1adjudicated based there-
on. As this case now stands they have not had their 
case heard and other persons, claimants to some of 
the water in question, were not even joined in the 
action. This peremptory action of the lower court 
cannot be sustained on the law for reasons hereto-
fore argued. We submit a trial under proper in-
structions from this Court is required to protect 
the appellants' constitutional rights. 
POINT 8 
THE UTAH STATE ENGINEER ERRED IN FAIL-
ING TO GRANT EITHER WASHING TON CITY'S AP-
PLICATION NO. 29676 OR THE APPLICATION OF THE 
OTHER APPELLANTS HEREIN, NO. a-4017, SINCE 
THESE PARTIES WERE THE SOLE USERS OF THE 
WATERS OF THE MILL CREEK WHICH HAD BEEN 
ABANDONED PRIOR TO 1953, AND WERE ALSO VIR· 
TUALLY THE SOLE USERS OF THE REMAINDER 
OF THE SUBJECT WATERS AFTER 1953. 
With such scant evidence before the trial court it 
was obviously impossible for the court to determine 
precisely who had utilized the subject waters during 
the years 1923 through 1957. However, a determin· 
ation of these facts is essential to an equitable dis-
position of the subject cases. The cases should, there-
fore, be remanded to the trial court for a determin· 
ation on the facts as to who precisely was using the 
subject waters during the critical periods here in 
question. Based on this determination the proper 
parties might recover for any damages arising out 
of the improper granting of the order of occupancy 
entered the 20th day of May, 1957. 
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POINT 9 
SINCE THE ORDER OF OCCUPANCY WAS ER-
HONEOUSLY ISSUED IN CIVIL NO. 2508, APPLICA-
TION NO. 59-5 WAS ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED TO 
ST. GEORGE CITY BY THE UTAH STATE ENGI-
NEER. 
Since the city of St. George was already in 
possession of the subject 2.57 c.f.s. of water and had 
been making use thereof since the 20th day of May, 
1957, it is understandable that the Utah State En-
gineer granted Application No. 59-5. (Ex. 3) How-
ever, the 2.57 c.f.s. of water were still legally the 
property of the individuals who had been making 
use of the same either as stockholders in the old 
Mill Creek Water Company, or as appropriators. 
The city of St. George had allegedly by 1957 
purchased a portion of the stock in the new Mill 
Creek Water Company, but since that Company did 
not at any time own any of the water in question 
the pm·chase of this stock availed it nothing. Clearly 
it did not thereby become entitled to the entire 2.57 
e.f.s. which it procured by the order of occupancy. 
The determination of the Utah State Engineer in 
granting Application No. 59-5 should, therefore, be 
reversed by this Court. 
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POINT 10 
THE UTAH STATE ENGINEER PROPERLY 
GRANTED THE CITY OF WASHING TON APPLICA-
TIONS NUMBERED a-3592 AND a-3593, WHICH 
GRANTED A PERMANENT CHANGE OF POINT OF 
DIVERSION OF .38 c.f.s. OF WATER, SINCE THE 
CITY OF WASHINGTON WAS ENTITLED TO THIS 
WATER UNDER THE VIRGIN RIVER DECREE. 
Following the acquisition of the subject waters 
by the city of 'St. George in 1957 and the installa-
tion of its collection facilities whereby the entire 
flow of the Mill Creek was diverted to the St. George 
water system, it became evident to the city of Wash-
ington that in order to utilize the water decreed 
to it under the Virgin River Decree, it must collect 
the same upstream from the diversion works con-
structed by the city of St. George. Washington City, 
being entitled to the subject .38 c.f.s. of water, was 
also entitled, pursuant to proper application to the 
Utah State Engineer's office, to have the point of 
diversion of the subject water changed in such a 
way that the water right could be utilized. Since 
the order of occupancy of May 20, 1957, however, 
the city of St. George has continued to utilize the 
entire flow of the Mill Creek and has blatantly ig-
nored the rights, not only of Washington City to the 
subject waters, but also ignored the rights of the 
other appellants herein. (See Exs. 4, 5) The trial 
court should upon remand be directed to enter a 
decree enforcing the rights of Washington City 
and restraining St. George from interference ther-
with. 
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POINT 11 
APPLICATION NO. a-3970 FILED BY THE NEW 
MILL CREEK WATER COMP ANY WAS IMPROPER-
LY GRANTED BY THE UTAH STATE ENGINEER 
SINCE SAID COMPANY HAD NO STANDING TO 
SEEK THE SAME. 
The real party in interest in seeking the change 
of point of diversion in Application No. a-3970 was 
St. George City, not the Mill Creek Water Company. 
However, since the city of St. George had already 
been denied the right to make the contemplated 
changes in the point of diversion and utilization 
of the waters ( Exs. 7, 8), no other alternative exist-
ed other than to seek the desired changes in the name 
of the "Mill Creek Water Company." As discussed 
supra, however, the new Mill Creek Water Company 
possessed no rights in the subject waters and, there-
fore, possessed no standing to seek the requested 
change. In addition, it is important to note that in 
making Application No. a-3970, little attempt was 
made by St. George City, in the name of the "Mill 
Creek Water Company," to comply with the require-
ments of Section 73-3-3 Utah Code Annotated 
( 1953) as amended in that the application does not 
clearly set forth the extent of the points of diver-
sion, development work, and of co-mingling. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the decision of the 
lower court whereby summary judgment was grant-
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ed in favor of the respondents and against the ap-
pellants, and should further rule as a matter of law 
that: 
(a) The Corporation known and referred to 
as the old Mill Creek Water Company ceased to exist 
as a legal entity when its charter expired February 
20, 1953; and its assets, including the water rights 
then owned by it, reverted to the stockholders of 
record of said company on that date; 
(b) The new Mill Creek Water Company in-
corporated in Utah February 8, 1957, did not by 
virtue of its incorporation succeed to the rights and 
to the property owned by the old corporation of the 
same name; 
( c) The action of the lower court whereby an 
order of occupancy which deprived the appellants of 
their water rights based on the false premise that 
the new Mill Creek Water Company was the owner 
and had succeeded to the rights of the old company, 
is erroneous. In recognizing the new company as the 
proper party against which to proceed in condemn-
ing the rights which were the property of the old 
company, the decision results in a deprivation of 
the appellants of their property without due pro· 
cess of law. 
( d) The City of Washington is the owner of 
.38 c.f .s. of the water of the Mill Creek as shown by 
the record and is entitled to the use thereof. 
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The cases should be remanded to the district 
court for trial under the law of this case as estab-
lished by the ruling of this Court on the foregoing 
matters. The district court should be instructed to 
determine what water rights exist in Mill Creek 
or Sand Hollow, who the owners of such rights are, 
the use that has been made of the subject water 
rights during the years 19'23 to 1957, the status, 
as appropriateors before the State Engineer, of the 
parties to these actions; and this Court should di-
rect that all rulings of the State Engineer hereto-
fore made involving water rights now before this 
Court in the instant litigation should be suspended 
pending the final determination of this lawsuit. The 
trial court should be further instructed to determine 
the amount of damages, if any, suffered by appel-
lants, as a result of having been deprived of the use 
of waters of Mill Creek or Sand Hollow, by virtue 
of the order of occupancy erroneously granted by the 
trial court on May 20, 1957. 
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